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ABSTRACT
This Thesis examines Telecommunications Industry 
efficiencies in the face of recent regulatory reforms.
Regulation was believed to be required because of the 
telecommunications industry's apparent natural monopoly.
The promise of regulation was to act as a surrogate to 
competition in controlling the monopolist. Regulation 
should require the monopolist to operate as close to a 
competitive marginal cost as possible. With effective 
regulation, the consumer would then expect to be paying as 
low a price as possible for the service provided by the 
regulated monopolist.
Aside from commendable technological and systems 
improvements by the telephone companies, no significant 
improvement in operating efficiency would be expected with 
rate of return regulation reform.
Included in this discussion of telecommunication 
industry regulation is an event analysis of the trend of the 
employee per access line efficiency correlated with the 
announcement of regulatory reforms. A significant 
relationship is demonstrated.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Considerable debate has been raging over the 
telecommunications policy for the United States. Three 
significant issues are in the forefront. They include 
cross-subsidies, technological change, and regulation 
reform.
Since the deregulation of the long distance market took 
place in 1984, significant technological change has 
continued in the industry. Additional market niches of the 
telecommunications industry are exposed to competitive 
entry.
The Federal Communications Commission has adopted a 
pro-competitive stance permitting competitive exploitation 
of those market niches. Regulatory reform has been 
suggested to enable the industry to react to the 
evolutionary changes. This reform contains built-in 
incentives to encourage the regulated monopolist to react to 
the changing environment. Incentives attempt to simulate a 
competitive environment for the telecommunications manager.
The promise of one regulated firm delivering all 
telecommunication services had a certain amount of appeal 
for the Progressive movement of the early 1900's. One firm
1
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should deliver telephone services for the least cost. With 
the recent competitive challenges in this industry, it is 
not clear that regulation has maintained the least cost 
across all services. Where there are examples of prices 
higher than competitive prices, cream skimming has continued 
through out the telecommunications industry.
The issue of real cost of service has been an ever 
pervasive problem. While there is evidence of competition 
in various sectors of the telecommunications industry, there 
is still a strong contention that the residential 
telecommunications market is a natural monopoly. Because of 
the economies of scale, it is unlikely that competition 
would be available to provide a market control mechanism for 
pricing in the residential sector.
As technology has continued to develop, the medium no 
longer restricts the provision of telecommunication 
services. Copper cable technology, as the only alternative 
for delivering telecommunication services, is now being 
replaced with fiber, wireless and coax technologies. These 
technologies are owned and utilized by other than 
telecommunications companies.
In recent years, the cable television industry has 
penetrated a significant portion of the marketplace in this 
country with their television services. Because of their 
fiber optic and coax networks, an alternative path for
3
delivery of residential telecommunication services now 
exists.
Additionally, cellular wireless telecommunication 
services have enjoyed a significant boom in recent years. 
Cellular wireless has achieved significant penetration in 
all the major markets in this country.
These additional delivery mechanisms for 
telecommunication services now available, notably the 
development of fiber optics, has also provided additional 
avenues for delivery of services. The placing of conduit 
systems and access ways to the customer is a crucial cost 
item for telecommunications. Existing infrastructures for 
other utilities have now, because of fiber optic technology, 
become a candidate for supporting the delivery of 
telecommunication services.
Because of the unobtrusive nature of fiber optics, 
fiber optic cables can be placed in power easements, gas 
easements and conduit systems without conflict. This opens 
up additional pathways for the delivery of telecommunication 
services. With this turn of events, it is doubtful that 
even the residential telecommunications market can remain a 
natural monopoly. The residential market, because of 
economies of scale, is considered the last possibility for 
competitive activity for telephone service.
Regulatory reform and price cap alternatives have been 
suggested as mechanisms, whereby responsible pricing can be
4
affected to all users of the telecommunication industry.
The recently enacted FCC Price Cap Policy allows a telephone 
company to earn more than the allowed rate of return for 
interstate jurisdiction services, provided that it agrees to 
a maximum pricing constraint. Determining actual costs for 
the provision of services is one of the bigger problems of 
regulation. The complexity of both the technologies and the 
services provided in the telecommunications industry, have 
contributed to the problems for regulation.
In the midst of these trying times, a study of the 
behavior of telephone industry management would be helpful 
for policy makers. Does management react to regulatory 
changes? To assess that, I analyzed the output efficiency 
of the telecommunications industry. One might suspect that 
technology and improved systems of operations make 
improvements in output efficiency. If, however, 
improvements are demonstrated because of changes in 
regulatory policy, and not explainable by changes in 
technology, another improvement possibility exists. The 
other possibility could be that certain management 
discretion exists in the present structure that has not been 
optimized by the regulatory system. This management 
discretion would be the issue that rate of return regulation 
has been unable to address and the reason to investigate 
alternatives.
5
The rate of growth of output efficiencies was analyzed 
to provide evidence of efficiencies not adopted by telephone 
management until regulatory reforms are initiated. A timing 
correlation of efficiency improvements, with those periods 
of important rate regulation reform, supports the hypothesis 
here.
CHAPTER 2
LITERARY REVIEW
I direct your attention to my study entitled "Literary 
Review on the Subject of Economic Regulation of the 
Telecommunication Industry", dated May, 1993. Supportive 
information, appropriate to the issues of this study is 
cited.
The literary review has been categorized into several 
sections that are noteworthy for our purposes.
The first section discusses the theory of monopoly and 
natural monopoly. The cost function of a natural monopoly 
is everywhere subadditive. More clearly stated, costs are 
subadditive if a monopoly firm can produce a given output at 
a lower cost than what two or more firms can.1 This would 
provide a basis for the belief that a natural monopoly 
telephone firm would have the lowest cost for its services. 
The prices for services of the telephone company would be 
sustainable based on its cost level.
Because of the complexity of the services provided in
the telecommunications industry, an important issue in price
sustainability has been that of rate design. Telephone
^W. W. Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly.. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 83.
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companies provide multiple services using the same 
investment. A problem exists assigning the proper pricing 
of individual services with regard to the common cost and 
common facilities used to deliver all of the services.
Rate designs have been recommended by the industry that 
are based on the inverse elasticity rule or Ramsey Pricing. 
This discriminatory pricing plan would charge more profit 
margin on services with the low elasticity, e.g., basic 
services, and less profit margin on services with high 
elasticity, e.g. competitive services. This plan would 
provide the best basis for defense against competitive entry 
into the industry.2
Discriminatory pricing, or pricing of the same service 
at different rates for different customers, has never been 
politically popular in the regulation of telecommunications. 
Politically acceptable pricing of services has been a 
problem and a major contributor to unsustainability of many 
monopoly services. Subsidies for inelastic services such as 
basic residential services, have been provided from more 
elastic services such as long distance and business 
services. The pricing levels for subsidizing services 
created margins attracting competitive entry. For these 
unsustainable monopoly services, competition has the power
2William J. Baumol et al., Contestable Markets and The 
Theory of Industry Structure (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, Inc., 1982), 224.
s
to provide the required constraints. Competition, however, 
would not provide all the answers for pricing consistent 
with the political agendas.3 Rate design is an important 
matter facing the telephone industry.
The second section of the literary review continues 
with a discussion of the regulatory history. The 
Progressive movement's influence on regulation in this 
country, dating back to the early 1900's, has been very 
strong. It is important to understand that the business 
interest of the business leaders at the time, were just as 
influential in establishing regulation of certain industries 
as the motivation to protect the basic consumer.4 Then, as 
well as now, businesses are interested in the benefits of 
regulation for their interests.
Regulatory constraint is covered in the Regulatory 
Policy section of the literary review. How to act as a 
proper competitive surrogate for the constraint of the 
monopolist, became the question.
Rate of return regulation was selected as the most 
viable vehicle for constraining the monopolist's activity in 
the telephone industry5. Rate of return regulation,
3Baumol, 349.
4Otis L. Graham, Jr. The Great Campaigns: Reform and War in 
America. 1900-1928. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971), 
16.
5Michael A. Crew, The Economics of Public Utility 
Regulation. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), 93-96.
however, showed significant shortcomings. Shortcomings are 
shown in the incentive to inflate the rate base and the lack 
of motivation to operate in the most efficient manner.6
In regulating the telecommunications industry, there 
are five major products that are addressed: 1)local access
2)local usage 3)inter-lata long distance services 4)long 
distance access 5)special services. The country was 
divided into regions for the purposes of differentiating 
long distance jurisdictions from local jurisdictions. This 
was accomplished with the deregulation of the long distance 
services. The regions were termed Local Areas of Transport 
Access, i.e. LATA. The FCC restricts the local exchange 
companies from providing inter-lata services.
Local access and usage are switched telephone services 
provided by the local exchange company to its residential 
and business end users. Long distance access is the 
switched service provide by the local exchange telephone 
company to the Long Distance Companies. The local company 
connects the end user to the long distance circuits.
Special services are those non-switched dedicated circuit 
services provided by either the long distance or local 
telephone companies. Local access is viewed as a fixed cost 
service and local usage is a variable cost service based on 
distance and duration of calls. Inter-lata long distance
6Crew, 120-134.
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services and long distance access are considered variable 
cost services. Special Services are fixed cost services.
Given these varied amounts of services, regulation has 
created opportunities for gains by intervention of various 
agents. This is termed rent seeking. These rent seekers 
can be insiders within the telecommunications industry, 
employees of the firms, the regulatory commissions, 
outsiders, competitors, regulators, attorneys and lobbyists. 
The effects of this rent seeking activity are hidden from 
the regulatory process.7
Some of the movements that are experienced in the 
regulatory process are caused by rent seekers who desire to 
preserve their position or gain an advantage to their 
present rent seeking position. The interests of the various 
rent seekers in the regulatory process cause the politics of 
public utility regulation.
Regulation is not a precise science. The regulatory 
process reaches settlements by gaining concurrence between 
the regulating agencies, the regulated firms and other 
interested parties.8 Resolutions are normally made by 
compromised stipulations. There is an opportunity in the
7Crew, 263-268.
8Robert Britt Horwitz, The Ironv of Regulatory Reform: the 
Deregulation of American Telecommunications. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), 124.-126.
regulatory process to deviate from the cost subadditivity 
precepts of a natural monopoly.
The next section, in the literary review, considers the 
regulatory commissions and the arduous task that regulatory 
agencies face.
Regulatory commissions are in a difficult position. 
Suspicious consumers view them as being captives of the 
firms that they are required to regulate.9 Commissions are 
viewed by the regulated firms as a road-block to their 
ability to provide efficient services. The firms are ever 
resistant to the suggestions of micro-managing for the 
purposes of establishing precise costing information for the 
purposes of the regulatory process. Given the shortcomings 
of the rate of return regulation, incentive measures have 
been suggested to be employed by the regulatory 
commissions.10 There is no clear consensus if those 
incentives should reward shareholders, managers or 
consumers.11 The regulatory commissions appear to have no 
clear mandate or vehicle to address the regulatory problems.
9Barry M. Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation: 
Creating. Designing, and Removing Regulatory Forms. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 93-94.
10Kurt A. Strasser, Regulating Utilities with Management 
Incentives. (New York: Quorum Books, 1989), 1.
^Strasser, 106.
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To understand the market of the telecommunications 
industry, a review of the next section discusses 
telecommunication history.
Curiously enough, the telecommunications industry was 
not born as a monopoly in the late 1800's. There were 
multiple telephone companies serving the same major market 
areas within the country. In 1907, American Bell company 
only commanded 49% of the market place. With the American 
Bell organization only making 8% on return in 1906, the 
company fell into the hands of the bankers of the J.P. 
Morgan, who reorganized it to American Telephone and 
Telegraph. Theodore Vail became the new Chairman of AT&T.
He established a strategy to gain control of the available 
technology and accommodate any regulatory pressure on the 
telecommunication industry. Vail agreed to submit to price, 
service and rate return regulation. In return, Vail 
expected entry restrictions in the telecommunications 
industry and a guarantee of a fair rate of return.12
Throughout the history of the telecommunication 
industries, competitive challenges were continually made on 
the fringe markets of the industry. The telecommunications 
industry natural monopoly status has been repeatedly tested 
as technology presents new opportunities. The tests have
12Gerald R. Faulhaber, Telecommunications in Turmoil: 
Technology and Public Policy (Cambridge: Ballinger Pub. Co., 
1987), 2.
come from the development of private point to point radio 
systems, private telephone switching equipment and private 
fiber optic systems.
The next section cites the telecommunication policy 
issues that have been continuing throughout the regulatory 
process. Because of the fragmented nature of policy 
decisions in the United States regulatory environment, 
telecommunication policy has not necessarily been a 
consistent and standard thread through our economic history. 
The initial telecommunication policy, articulated by the 
Communications Act of 1934, was a provision of universal 
service for the country.13 Since the late 1980's, more than 
95% of all households in the country have telecommunication 
service^. The universal service goal has virtually been 
met. The major policy issue for the country has changed.
The new challenge will be to determine the best way 
telecommunication services can be provided for the future.
The issues that I have highlighted are as follows:
1)Inter-service cost subsidies complicate the natural
monopoly precept of lowest cost for services in the
multiproduct telecommunications industry. The lack of price
sustainability of some services has allowed competitive
entry, because of cross-subsidies. 2)Rate design has been
the area of discussion about the solutions to price
13Walter G. Bolter et al., Telecommunications Policy for the 
1990s and Bevond (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), 81.
sustainability. 3)Telephone firms and other rent seekers 
have moved to benefit from the regulatory process.
The tough job of the imprecise regulatory process is 
seeking concurrence. The process has evolved to an era of 
incentive programs. These incentive programs, like 
telephone regulations, have been fragmented because of the 
many regulatory jurisdictions in this country. These issues 
serve as a platform to outline the model for this thesis.
CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL MODEL
How responsive is telephone management to regulatory 
reform? Is there planning or implementation lags in their 
responses, or are their immediate actions that are evident? 
The management of a regulated telephone company deals with 
many constraints. Besides the typical business constraints, 
the regulatory constraint is a big factor to this industry.
The management of the telephone company is a very 
complex endeavor. Market factors, production factors, 
financial factors and economic factors are examples of 
influences on management. To explore my issue, I will deal 
with a small portion of the influences on the industry.
Federal Communication Commission Policy is a common 
regulatory factor with the twelve largest telephone 
companies. Telephone companies have state regulations that 
are important influences as well. The most desirable study 
would be to look at each company's action, while considering 
its unique state and federal regulatory environment. Most 
of the twelve largest telephone companies, representing 94% 
of the local telephone service in the country, serve in 
multiple states. Unfortunately, only expense data is 
available for the individual states, not employee data. Of
15
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the expense data available, some of the expense is direct 
and some is allocated from sister operations and/or parent 
operations. Individual state data poses a problem of 
questionable usability.
Since I was unable to find company employee detail by 
state, each company was contacted to request the 
information. Most refused to supply the information because 
it was considered proprietary. For the companies that were 
willing to work with me, confusion developed on how to 
apportion shared employee resources. Restructuring and 
reorganization between the states during the period of study 
also contributed to this quandary. This search for viable 
data revealed that the best data would be company wide data, 
that is publicly reported with consistent meaning through 
the study period.
The behavior of the telecommunications manager is our 
focus. The profit optimizing manager would choose a course 
of action based on the regulatory constraints at the time. 
Even though the regulatory process desires to move the firm 
to a competitive marginal cost for the pricing of regulated 
services, there remains managerial discretion in the 
expenses of an operation. The amount of managerial 
discretion, due to imprecise information, is not available 
for review in the regulatory process. The existence of this 
discretionary margin may be shown, if management improves 
efficiency at some trigger point independent of any
17
technology or system improvements. Technology and system 
improvements take preparation and lead time that would lag 
any one trigger point. Personnel levels would be a resource 
that could be readily adjusted. A review of the total 
company data and federal regulatory reform would be 
appropriate to test for discretionary margin.
The theoretical model for this study is a review of the 
rate of growth of local exchange telecommunication 
companies7 output efficiencies. With the divestiture of the 
regional Bell operating companies from AT&T in 1984, data 
became available for the individual local exchange telephone 
companies.
There are three market sectors to the local telephone 
company: 1)business services 2)residential services
3)access services. Access services are those services 
provided to the long distance telephone companies that 
connect to them. They provide access to the local business 
and residential customers by way of that connection.
Since 1985, operations information is available for the 
regional Bell operating companies and the other independent 
telephone companies. The employees, divided by the number 
of telephone service lines in billing, will be used as a 
measure of efficiency. The resulting index would be 
analyzed over the time period from 1985 to 1991. Over that 
period, the rate of change in efficiency will be analyzed to 
determine if any impacts of the various regulatory actions
in the industry occurred. The theoretical model can be 
expressed as follows:
Employees/Access Line = Company-j^i * YdummyS * ePTrend #
The Company variable is set to a value of e at the 
observation of the company in question, or 1 if not.
The Ydummy variable is set to a value of e if it is 
year of regulatory action, or 1 if not. To test the one 
year effect, the dummy variable is triggered on for the 
represented year and then triggered off for all other years. 
To determine lasting effect the dummy variable is triggered 
on and left on after the represented year.
Along with the review of the local exchange telephone 
companies, the index of output per hour for all employees is 
analyzed. The index represents the total telephone industry 
for the 1980's, using 1977 as a base index of 100. The 
theoretical model can be expressed as follows:
Index = a * Ydummy^ * ePTrenc* .
In chapter 4 all parameters are discussed, as linear 
transformations are done for estimation purposes.
To assess the model the following assumptions of 
telecommunications industry are provided. During the 
1980's, there were no extraordinary changes in
telecommunication technologies. Digital switching 
technologies were introduced in the late 1970's. Fiber 
optic technology was delivered in the early 1980's.
A gradual improvement trend was pervasive in the 
1980's. Administrative system efficiencies experienced 
steady, but no dramatic improvements in any particular year 
during this period. It was appropriate to expect that the 
growth rate in efficiency would be stable through the 
1980's .
The two major regulatory activities that occurred in 
telecommunications in the 1980's, would be long distance 
service deregulation and price cap regulation.
CHAPTER 4
THE DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL
To give the reader an appreciation of the data that 
have been collected, the following is presented for review. 
These data show the improvement that has been experienced in 
employees per access line for the average local telephone 
company and various telecommunications companies that were 
reviewed. It should be noted that an improvement in this 
context is a decline in employees per access line. The 
objective is a lower number of employees. The employee data 
are a proxy for cost. With reduced employees come reduced 
cost.
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Figure 1 Average Employees Per Service Line (From United 
States Telephone Association PhoneFacts, 1985 - 1991)
This graph presents the average company efficiency. It 
would be helpful to look at the variety of results by 
company. The following three graphs depict the individual 
company indexes.
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Figure 2 Local Telephone Companies Employees Per Service 
Line (From United States Telephone Association PhoneFacts, 
1985 - 1991)
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Line (From United States Telephone Association PhoneFacts, 
1985 - 1991)
Figure 4 Local Telephone Companies Employees Per Service 
Line (From United States Telephone Association PhoneFacts, 
1985 - 1991)
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The output per hour for all employees of the total 
telecommunication industry was also considered. The 
following graph will show the trend during that period.
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Figure 5 Telephone Communications Indexes of Output per 
Hour for All Employees 1980-1988 (From Statistical Abstract 
of the U.S., 1980-1989)
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The theoretical model expressed in chapter 3 is 
transformed into a linear form by taking the natural 
logarithm for the purpose of estimation. The basic linear 
equation for the model would be:
Ln(Employees/Access Line) =
Ln(a) + (3Trend + 5Ln(Ydummy) + Y^Ln(Co^) + e-ĵ
To test the significance of regulatory activity in the 
industry, dummy variables will be assigned for those years 
of the implemented regulatory change. Because of the linear 
transformation, the dummy variables are set on with a value 
of 1 and set off with a value of 0. In this model, P 
(beta), the coefficient of the Trend Variable, would be the 
growth rate of the index (Employees/Access Line). An 
improving growth rate would be a negative value. The 
coefficient 8 (delta), represents the deviation from the 
growth rate of the index for the year specified. The 
variables significantly different from zero, would be 
required to show a correlation in timing for the year with 
regulatory action and a significant change in rate of growth 
in efficiency. The coefficient a (alpha) is the intercept 
and the fixed effect for the omitted company dummy variable. 
The coefficient y (gamma) is a shift of the intercept for a 
specified company.
To substantiate the local telephone company findings, a 
rate of change of output efficiency model for the 
telecommunications industry has been analyzed for the 
1980's. The index of output per hour for all employees for 
telephone communications was studied. The source for this 
data was The Statistical Abstract of the U.S. The 
theoretical model is transformed into a linear form by 
taking the natural logarithm for estimation as follows:
Ln( Index) = Ln(a) + (3Trend + 8Ln(Ydummy) + et
As in the pervious model, a dummy variable, for those years 
where regulatory changes were affected, was utilized . In 
this model an improving growth rate would be a positive 
number for the trend coefficient. The coefficients would 
have the same meaning as in the first model.
Chapter 5
Results
The null hypothesis for this thesis is as follows: A 
significant increase in efficiency should not be expected 
once alternative rate regulation for interexchange services 
was imposed, in 1991, on the local telephone companies.
Price Caps, or alternate rate regulation, was announced 
to be effective January 1, 1991, for the local exchange 
companies. A regression of the trend in improvement showed 
an annual 6% rate of growth in efficiency improvement, for 
the study period of 1985 through 1991. The following Table 
of the regression output is offered for review.
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Table 1 Least Squares Regression with Dependent Variable of 
Logarithm(Employees/Access Line)
Number of observations: 84
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIG
Constant -4.9830287 0.0236397 -210.79052 0.0000
Trend Variable -0.0596905 0.0036191 -16.493299 0.0000
ALLTEL 0.0619553 0.0280333 2.2100647 0.0304
Ameritech -0.1774234 0.0280333 -6.3290327 0.0000
Bell Atlantic -0.2653469 0.0280333 -9.4654332 0.0000
Bell South 0.0054549 0.0280333 0.1945885 0.8463
GENTEL 0.1619602 0.0280333 5.7774302 0.0000
NYNEX -0.0555081 0.0280333 -1.9800815 0.0516
Pac Telesis -0.0859299 0.0280333 -3.0652854 0.0031
SNET 0.2068086 0.0280333 7.3772600 0.0000
Southwestern -0.0854026 0.0280333 -3.0464751 0.0033
U.S. West -0.1107413 0.0280333 -3.9503533 0.0002
United 0.0183727 0.0280333 0.6553884 0.5144
Year 1991 0.0190404 0.0206848 0.9205034 0.3605
R-squared 0.928305 Mean of dependent var •-5.246221
Adjusted R-squared 0.914 990 S.D. of dependent var 0.179876
S.E. of regression 0.052445 Sum of squared resid 0.192537
Log likelihood 136.0972 F-statistic 69.71975
Durbin-Watson stat 2.238176 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
This table indicates the year of 1991 did not show any 
significant change in that trend. Accordingly, the null 
hypothesis would have to be accepted. In 1991, the 
institution of price cap regulation for the local exchange 
companies on their inter-exchange services, did not have a 
significant impact on the rate of growth in efficiency 
improvements.
Pooled cross-sectional and time series data used in 
this regression required an additional test to insure that 
serial correlation was not brought about in the shifts to a
different company's data. The residuals of the initial 
regression were regressed against the lagged residuals 
excluding the year 1985 for each company. No significant 
relationship was shown between the residuals and lagged 
residuals. This additional test confirms no evidence of 
serial correlation in my analysis.
CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSIONS
The null hypothesis is accepted. No significant 
impact, due to the instituting of local exchange price cap 
regulations on interexchange services, is apparent in 1991. 
The data suggests that there was an impact, (using a 1 Tail 
Test) in the years of 1986-1987, on the rate of growth in 
efficiencies.
Table 2 Least Squares Regression with Dependent Variable of 
Logarithm(Employees/Access Line)
Number of observations: 84
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIG
Constant -4.9698129 0.0246480 -201.63165 0.0000
Trend Variable-0.0604489 0.0031927 -18.933462 0.0000
ALLTEL 0.0619553 0.0275388 2.2497481 0.0276
Ameritech -0.1774234 0.0275388 -6.4426752 0.0000
Bell Atlantic -0.2653469 0.0275388 -9.6353921 0.0000
Bell South 0.0054549 0.0275388 0.1980825 0.8436
GENTEL 0.1619602 0.0275388 5.8811682 0.0000
NYNEX -0.0555081 0.0275388 -2.0156354 0.0477
Pac Telesis -0.0859299 0.0275388 -3.1203249 0.0026
SNET 0.2068086 0.0275388 7.5097242 0.0000
Southwestern -0.0854026 0.0275388 -3.1011769 0.0028
U.S. West -0.1107413 0.0275388 -4.0212848 0.0001
United 0.0183727 0.0275388 0.6671564 0.5069
Year 1986-1987-0.0261182 0.0141347 -1.8478099 0.0689
R-squared 0.930812 Mean of dependent var -5.246221
Adjusted R-squared 0.917963 S.D. of dependent var 0.179876
S.E. of regression 0.051520 Sum of squared resid 0.185804
Log likelihood 137.5921 F-statistic 72.44107
Durbin-Watson stat 2.209982 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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In this regression, the year dummy variable was set on 
for 1986 and 1987. The results for years 1986 and 1987, 
individually, were not significant. Why would regression 
results show evidence of response in 1986-1987 as opposed to 
1991? Alternate regulation changes do not happen in any one 
particular period. It takes a significant lead time for the 
regulatory process to occur.
The reason for the lead time requirement becomes clear 
with a discussion of the process. Within the 
Telecommunications Industry, trade associations announce 
possible changes in alternatives for regulation. The FCC 
issues a notice of proposed rule making and asks for 
responses. After responses are received, proposed rules are 
issued by the FCC. Supplemental rules are announced as the 
issues are considered within an industry. Ultimately, an 
order is issued by the Federal Communications Commission 
citing the timing and what changes will be implemented.
In the case of Price Cap regulation, the National 
Telecommunications and Information Agency issued a notice of 
request for alternate rate regulation comments on October 
10, 1986. The objectives for this request where to 
determine the effectiveness of rate of return regulation and 
to discuss alternatives. The alternatives were social 
contracts, market basket concepts, band pricing and price 
caps.
3.1
This request for comments was an opportunity for the 
telecommunications industry to formalize the various plans 
that had been circulating for alternate rate regulation.
The FCC sent out their notice of proposed rule making in 
1987, with adaptations continuing through 1988.
Ultimately, the FCC adopted price caps for AT&T 
effective July 1, 1989. Further, it adopted price caps 
regulation for local exchange companies for interstate 
jurisdictions effective January 1, 1991. The seeds were 
sewn for price cap regulations in October, 1986. This 
suggested those telephone company managers, on the basis of 
the inquiries initiated in 1986 and 1987, reacted 
immediately. They reacted on their expectations of what the 
new regulation environment for the telecommunications 
industry would be.
As verification, the regression results show that in 
the period of 1986 and 1987, there was a significant 
increase in rate of change of approximately 3%. These 
results suggest management discretion was exercised by local 
exchange telecommunication executives. They anticipated 
that their price cap scheme would be accepted. They would 
have every motivation to reduce expenses as quickly as 
possible, so as to optimize their income potential. At some 
point, the benefits of improving efficiency would be 
experienced by incentive price cap regulation. Apparently 
not all changes where effected in the last two months of
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1986. Some improvements in growth rates continued on in
1987.
Regressions where run to determine if any other time 
periods showed significant impact on efficiency. None were 
found. Additionally, the year dummy variables where set on 
for a specific year; plus, all subsequent years to test for 
lasting effect. No significant lasting effects were 
evident.
To contrast these findings, efficiency data were 
accumulated for the total Telecommunications industry for 
the 1980's. This data included the entire industry, long 
distance as well as local exchange companies. To verify the 
experience in the local exchange telephone companies, an 
additional regression was run on the indices.
Table 3 Least Square Regression with Dependent Variable of 
Logarithm(Index of Output per Man-hour)
Number of observations; 9
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIG
Constant 4.2816453 0.0087159 491.24661 0.0000
Trend Variable 0.0487702 0.0006165 79.104811 0.0000
Year 1983 0.0617658 0.0049101 12.579248 0.0001
Year 1986 0.0212980 0.0050572 4.2113887 0.0084
R-squared 0.999278 Mean of dependent var 4.973657
Adjusted R-squared 0.998845 S.D. of dependent var 0.134373 
S.E. of regression 0.004566 Sum of squared resid 0.000104 
Log likelihood 38.37599 F-statistic 2307.498
Durbin-Watson stat 2.095110 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
This regression shows, with significance, an improvement in 
the growth rate of the output index in 1983 and 1986. Why 
1986? In 1986, the intent for alternate rate of regulation 
consideration for price caps was announced. The industry 
timing results did not precisely match the local exchange 
company results because of the influence of AT&T in the 
data. The initial price cap discussions where directed at 
AT&T. AT&T responded in late 1986. The local exchange 
companies reacted in late 1986 through 1987.
The reaction evident in 1983, is due to the 
telecommunications industry preparation for the deregulation 
of the long distance telephone service.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
On the basis of this analysis, telecommunication 
managers respond to regulatory reforms. In addition to long 
term improvements made available by changing technologies, 
short run improvements can be opted for by management. The 
amount of improvement may be controlled by management, based 
on the reforms initiated. Telecommunication management 
responds with rational expectation. They do not wait for 
rule or policy changes.
In the present incentive regulatory scheme the lowest 
cost for services is not assured. The discretionary margins 
are evident but this analysis does not show that all margins 
have been reduced. The resolution of problems caused by 
cross subsidies and rate design imperfections, may not 
provide price sustainability. If solutions in rate design 
are found with out reducing discretionary margins to 
competitive levels, price sustainability will not be 
attained. The issues of management discretion on operating 
choices seem to be fertile ground for consideration of 
telecommunication industry improvements in competitive price 
sustainability.
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Additionally, the clarifying of which rent seeker is 
benefiting from regulatory efforts, would help provide 
information about improvements that can be made in the 
regulatory process.
Hopefully evidence presented in this study can point 
the way for additional improvements in the telecommunication 
industry.
APPENDIX I
DATA UTILIZED FOR REGRESSIONS
OBSERVATION ACCESS 
LINES
EMPLOYEES EMPLOYEES PER 
ACCESS LINES
ALLTEL
1985 905200.0 5968.000 0.006593
1986 953943.0 5876.000 0.006160
1987 982996.0 5695.000 0.005794
1988 1084283 . 7532.000 0.006947
1989 1123590. 5887.000 0.005239
1990 1157105. 5899.000 0.005098
1991 1210864. 5822.000 0.004808
Ameritech
1985 14555000 74094.00 0.005091
1986 14755000 71170.00 0.004823
1987 15094000 71871.00 0.004762
1988 15469000 67783.00 0.004382
1989 15899000 71419.00 0.004492
1990 16278000 69430.00 0.004265
1991 16584000 66390.00 0.004003
lell ,Atlantic
1985 15090000 77750.00 0.005152
1986 15508973 70768.00 0.004563
1987 16056907 71260.00 0.004438
1988 16541000 65815.00 0.003979
1989 17056802 67197.00 0.003940
1990 17484000 62050.00 0.003549
1991 17750000 64922.00 0.003658
Jell South
1985 14532000 91384.00 0.006288
1986 15045900 96886.00 0.006439
1987 15739470 85540.00 0.005435
1988 16407000 100280.0 0.006112
1989 16720367 77624.00 0.004642
1990 17721560 85960.00 0.004851
1991 17614736 82200.00 0.004667
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OBSERVATION ACCESS 
LINES
EMPLOYEES EMPLOYEES PER 
ACCESS LINES
Centel
1985 1299300. 8598.000 0.006617
1986 1354317. 8109.000 0.005988
1987 1422969. 7837.000 0.005507
1988 1503192. 7768.000 0.005168
1989 1590716. 7886.000 0.004958
1990 1670135. 8265.000 0.004949
1991 1593406. 7834.000 0.004917
Gen Tel
1985 12721200 102763 .0 0.008078
1986 13408250 98376.00 0.007337
1987 13937373 96623.00 0.006933
1988 14650000 90152.00 0.006154
1989 14891090 87990.00 0.005909
1990 15183743 85316.00 0.005619
1991 15632000 78700.00 0.005035
NYNEX
1985 13623000 94900.00 0.006966
1986 13962255 76000.00 0.005443
1987 16046014 78890.00 0.004916
1988 14851000 76900.00 0.005178
1989 14960953 73222.00 0.004894
1990 15511119 71970.00 0.004640
1991 15409521 64852.00 0.004209
Pacific Telesis
1985 11692000 71000.00 0.006073
1986 12068564 70711.00 0.005859
1987 12525000 67770.00 0.005411
1988 13093000 63618.00 0.004859
1989 14202949 65057.00 0.004581
1990 14558033 61760.00 0.004242
1991 14262000 58485.00 0.004101
Southern New England Tel
1985 1674000. 13500.00 0.008065
1986 1711533. 13155.00 0.007686
1987 1779204. 12972.00 0.007291
1988 1839000. 12533.00 0.006815
1989 1875000. 11339.00 0.006047
1990 1904000. 11001.00 0.005778
1991 1887000. 10147.00 0.005377
4 0
OBSERVATION ACCESS EMPLOYEES EMPLOYEES
LINES ACCESS l i :
Southwestern Bell
1985 10880000 62000.00 0.005699
1986 11772089 61774.00 0.005247
1987 11104974 59620.00 0.005369
1988 11340449 57970.00 0.005112
1989 11444061 58400.00 0.005103
1990 12562533 52864.00 0.004208
1991 12934679 54923.00 0.004246
U.S. West
1985 11195000 66538.00 0.005944
1986 11332000 59221.00 0.005226
1987 11613000 57463.00 0.004948
1988 11878000 56749.00 0.004778
1989 12306536 58778.00 0.004776
1990 12562533 52860.00 0.004208
1991 12934679 54923.00 0.004246
United
1985 3256800. 21913.00 0.006728
1986 3381332. 20221.00 0.005980
1987 3516814. 20427.00 0.005808
1988 3685337. 19594.00 0.005317
1989 3811980. 20115.00 0.005277
1990 3946812. 19593.00 0.004964
1991 4083205. 19411.00 0.004754
Observations Index of 
Output per 
Hour for 
all 
Employees 
1977 = 100
1980 118.1000
1981 124.4000
1982 129.1000
1983 145.1000
1984 143.0000
1985 149.8000
1986 161.3000
1987 165.9000
1988 176.7000
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